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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A large part of normal human behavior consists of making judgments about
other people. This study is concerned with how persons develop the ability to
make judgments of others. The research strategy to be followed in this thesis
is developmental in that we will attempt to investigate how certain social
judgment processes emerge as children mature.
Historically, two general lines of inquiry characterize the social judg-
ment literature. The first deals with the recognition and identification of
emotions in others. Typically, recognition studies involve the presentation
of a stimulus which conveys an emotion to a group of judges whose task is to
label the emotion being expressed. A variety of stimuli have been used in
this area. For example, a real person (Sherman, 1927); a photograph of a per-
son (Feleky, 192lij Dunlap, 1927; F. H. Allport, 192k; Munn, 19U0; and
Schlosberg, 1952); and a drawing representing a person (Sherman, 1927).
Although some of the findings in this area are replicable, Bruner and Tagiuri
(195U) contend that most of the evidence is contradictory and inconclusive.
The second line of inquiry is concerned with the judgment or perception
of personality. Early investigations in this area have focused on the accu-
racy of perception as determined by the characteristics of the judge in terms
of a halo effect (Thorndike, 1920); the logical error (Guilford, 1936); and
the leniency effect (Lemann and Soloman, 1952). Also used was the relation-
ship between the judge and judged (Kelly, 19U8); personality characteristics
(Taft, 1950); intelligence (Dymond, 19U9); and aesthetic senitiveness
(G. W. Allport, 1937). Again, Bruner and Tagiuri (195U) contend that these
2studies "... have not progressed lo a point at which firm substantive conclu-
sions can be brought to bear..." (Bruner and Tagiuri, 19!?U, p. 6U6)
Both the identification of emotions in others and judgments of person-
ality by a perceiver are based on the utilization of different cues. How
these cues are perceived, why some are perceived and not others, and how we
learn to use these cues in forming an impression of another may be viewed as
a problem in cognition. Or, as Scheerer has expressed it, "From the cognitive
point of view, cognition begins with perception." (Scheerer, 195>9, P- 97)
This viewpoint is well illustrated by the work of Michotte (19!?0) . He per-
formed a series of experiments using simple geometric figures which were moved
toward or away from each other in order to investigate how these movements
would be interpreted by subjects, and, whether specific sequences of motion
would be perceived as functional causal connections. His results led him to
suggest that perceptual cues are organized into cognitive formations which
vary in correspondence with changes in the stimulus conditions, e.g., rate of
movement, directions, and distance. Furthermore, Michotte describes causal
connections between objects as being "felt" connections. He thus provides a
link between the traditionally separate areas of emotion and cognition which
allows us to consider the social implications of cognitive structuring rela-
tive to the use of perceptual cues.
Intensive research on cognitive development is still a comparatively
recent trend in psychology. However, theory and research in this area have
progressed sufficiently so that a number of generalizations are now available.
Moreover, since the generalizations that are agreed upon by several theorists
in this area, such as Piaget, Werner, and Bruner, are indicative of rather
broad trends, they can be applied to many areas of cognitive functioning. The
work reported in this thesis is based upon the belief that since person per-
3ception can be viewed as a problem in cognition, it can be investigated effec-
tively from the standpoint of cognitive development theory.
In the present study, certain general trends in cognitive development
described by Piaget, Bruner, and Werner are applied to the problem of how
children form impressions of others. Werner (19U8) contends that a child's
causal thinking may be defined as an increasing adaptation of thought to
objective fact and that the law of development is here one of increasing
abstraction and generalization. Piaget (19^0) suggests that mental operations
derive from overt operations and that these mental operations can be des-
cribed in terms of four chronologically successive stages. The major divis-
ion, however, is between the age periods four to seven and seven to eleven.
The thinking of younger children is described as artificialistic, animistic,
and egocentric, while the thinking of older children is characterized by a
grasp of multiple points of view and of relational concepts. Finally, Bruner
(I96L1) distinguishes three modes of cognitive representation: enactive,
iconic, and symbolic. Bruner and his associates have shown that so long as
iconic representation dominates, (that is so long as the percept is primary),
it is difficult for the child to develop the higher order symbolic technique.
All these writers apparently agree that there is a progression in the
child's ability to think abstractly and that there are transitional stages
gone through as children achieve higher levels of cognitive development. In
most instances, this means that the child moves from a technique of dealing
with things one aspect at a time in terms of their perceptual appearance, to
dealing with several features at the same time and in some organized hierar-
chical relationship.
No direct empirical application of these generalizations to social judg-
ment are to be found in the literature. However, two writers have suggested
it
how these generalizations might be applied. Bruner contends that for the
child, "Taking a view external to himself is as difficult for him socially as
it is perceptually and intellectually." (Bruner, 1966, p. 2$) Furthermore,
Brown (1965), in reviewing some studies by Piaget, suggests that the young
child's understanding of certain social activities begins with perceptually
obvious externals.
To recapitulate briefly, it appears that a young child attends to the
present aspect of stimuli when he is asked to give a valuating response.
When faced with the problem of logically integrating several aspects of a
situation, he cannot disregard the perceptually obtrusive. He does not con-
cern himself with mitigating or qualifying conditions; e.g., intentionality.
Higher order conceptualization occurs at a later age and involves accomoda-
tions to contexts not directly given in perception.
The general aim of this study is to examine social judgment as a func-
tion of stages of cognitive development. To carry out this aim we will test
children on a social judgment task involving perceptual cues of the type that
have been studied in general cognitive development research. It is expected
that children in more advanced stages of cognitive development will show
greater ability to derive socially relevant meanings from such cues than will
younger children.
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
The research reported in this thesis involves an empirical integration
of two heretofore relatively separate lines of inquiry, viz: social percep-
tion and cognitive development. In the following pages these areas are dis-
cussed separately in some detail, and theoretical relations between them are
explored.
Social Perception.
The problem of how people judge others is variously described in the
literature as "impression formation," "social judgment," "social cognition,"
"person perception," and "social perception." Following the literature, we
view these terms as quite interchangable, but for definition purposes we will
employ Tagiuri's statement on "person perception." He says that the use of
this term is appropriate "whenever the perceiver regards the object as having
the potential of representation and intentionality. " (Tagiuri, 1958, p. x)
And he adds that "...when we speak of person perception or of knowledge of
persons, we refer mostly to the observations we make about intentions
,
atti-
tudes, emotions, ideas, abilities, purposes, traits—events that are, so to
speak, inside the person. We make these observations as we follow. ..the
actions of persons, but we formulate the actions in terms that are strictly
psychological." (Tagiuri, 1958, p. x)
Gollin has gone on to say that "Impressions of other persons consist of
representations which involve modifications of the stimulus qualities emitted
by the person being judged." (Gollin, 1958, p. 139). If we assume that the
observer tends to order and organize the diverse behavior being presented,
6then it may also be assumed that, the structure imposed by the observer is not
haphazard but is systematically related to particular cues in the situation.
Moreover, the type of structure imposed by the observer must also be depend-
ent upon the unique personality of the observer. Thus, social perception can
be viewed as an interaction between the stimuli available and the characteris-
tic manner in which the observer tends to organize such stimuli. (See Werner,
191*8; Heider and Simmel, 19UU; Gollin, 1958; Asch, 19U6; and Kelly, 1955.)
Social perception research, from about 1920 until 1950, (See Bruner and
Tagiuri, 195U), dealt primarily with the recognition and identification of
emotions in others and in addition, with the accuracy of judgment or the char-
acteristics of good or poor judges. In most cases these investigations
required observers to provide or select from a list terms which they felt
characterized the person, emotion, or behavior that was being judged. Very
little attention was given to the structuring of such social judgments.
Asch (19^6) was one of the first to conduct systematic investigations
into the organizational characteristics of social judgments. Asch's method
was to read to a group of subjects a list of trait-names said to denote char-
acteristics belonging to a particular person, asking them to form an impres-
sion of this person, and then to give a brief characterization in a few sen-
tences. He concluded that the impressions formed were unified, completed,
and rounded. Most important is his conclusion that as soon as two or more
traits are said to belong to one person, they no longer exist as isolated
traits, but instead there is a dynamic interaction among them. The whole
system of relations between traits attributed to a particular individual
determines which of these traits will become central. But in a critique of
the Asch investigation, Luchins (19U8) suggested that trait lists are inade-
quate for studies of impression formation because such a task is not repre-
7sentative of a real-life situation in which impressions are usually formed.
Luchins repeated one of Asch's experiments and in analyzing the written
impressions which he obtained, reported that "...it would be far-fetched to
say of most of them that they were unified, completed, and rounded." (Luchins,
191*8, p. 322)
To surmount some of the weaknesses in Asch's studies and to deal with
some of the methodological criticisms made by Luchins, Gollin (195U) used a
different method to study impression formation. In order to obtain precise
control of the behavior of persons being judged and to preserve some of the
complexity and vividness of real-life situations, he used a motion picture in
which a single "star" is seen behaving in various ways. His results showed
that the employment of stimulus material which retains more of the complexity
of live impression-formation situations yields written impressions which lend
themselves to a more intensive analysis than that provided by trait-name
lists. He concluded "that the formation of an impression of the personality
of another is a function not only of the characteristics of the person being
observed, but also to a considerable extent a function of the underlying
perceptual-cognitive organizing process in the observer." (Gollin, 195U>
p. 76) It seems here that having conducted the type of study suggested by
Luchin's criticism of Asch, Gollin' s conclusion is not very different from
Asch's, viz.: the impression one forms is dependent upon organizing processes.
An alternative approach to studying person perception that is more phe-
nomenological in nature is provided by the work of From (1957) and Cantril
(1957). They have suggested that we might best understand the relation
between perceived stimuli and how these cues are cognitively organized if we
note that the event to which we attend is the intention or purpose of the
other. In order to do what they suggest we need an effective methodology.
8One feasible way to implement their suggestions is provided by Heider and
Simmel (I9bu).
In an attempt to study how the apparent behavior of others is cognized
by the obsorver, Heidor and Simmel (l9bh) devised a technique utilizing geo-
metric figures (a large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle,) which
moved about. They presented these figures to adult Ss via a moving film
sequence. The Ss were asked to explain what was happening by telling a story
about the action in the film sequence. The use of these geometric figures in
a film sequence is justified in terms of operational and quantitative preci-
sion because "The stimulus has many geometrical and temporal features which
can be defined in an exact way and which can be varied infinitely. " (Heider
and Simmel, 19hh, p. 251)
Most Ss spontaneously perceive the picture in terms of animated beings.
In the main experiment, S was instructed to interpret the movements as
actions of persons, which they in fact did. The experimenters felt that a
causal interpretation played an important role in the organization of various
aspects of the film into a story. The film was also analyzed in terms of the
interpretation given to movement combinations. Successive movement with
momentary contact was described by most of the subjects as an agressive rela-
tionship wherein one object strikes the other. Simultaneous movement of two
objects, with or without contact, resulted in ambiguous interpretations. The
movements are organized in terms of acts of persons. The S's descriptions
not only made clear which person but also what motive or need within that per-
son, was responsible for the movement. Relative to the interpretations given
by Ss, Heider and Simmel concluded that "A description of movements in terms
of motives. . .taps environmental layers of greater invariancy." In addition
"...acts of persons have to be viewed in terms of motives in order that the
9succession of changes becomes a connected sequence." (Heider and Simmel,
192U*, P. 2$8)
Person perception will be investigated in this research through the
medium of short cartoon sequences using geometric figures to represent per-
sons in varying interaction patterns. Cartoon sequences can be arranged to
convey various intentions. Heider and Simmel (19UU) demonstrated that adult
Ss will accept such figures as persons and describe their actions as causally
motivated. Pilot work with children carried out in connection with the pre-
sent study indicates that they too are able to consider such material as
being representative of meaningful social relations.
Cognitive Development .
The second major theoretical basis for this thesis is cognitive develop-
ment theory. We rely here on three of the major theorists; Bruner, Werner,
and Piaget.
Development in cognition is believed by Bruner (196U) to be most clearly
demonstrated in verbal behavior. Cognition as verbal behavior is subject to
certain consistent and sequential patterns. These patterns (sometimes called
"stages") are seen as necessarily sequential but in no way is time per se a
variable of significance. Evidence of cognitive development also depends on
output in the form of measurable, appropriate performance. Bruner (196U)
considers that humans represent the recurrent features of their environment
in three ways: through action, imagery, and language. He calls the three
modes of representation enactive, iconic, and symbolic. It is the transition
from iconic to symbolic representation that is most relevant for our purposes.
The children who use iconic representation are characterized by being more
highly sensitive to the spatial-qualitative organization of experience and
less to the ordering principles governing such organization. They can
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recognize and reproduce but cannot produce new structures based on rule. An
experiment by Druner and Kenney (1966) demonstrated some of the characteristic
differences between iconic and symbolic representation. In the main, the
difference lies in the younger children, age 5, relying more heavily on single
perceptual attributes. The older children, aged 7, attend to more than one
attribute in the situation; in addition, they utilize a hierarchical grouping
that goes beyond perceptual inclusion.
Werner (1957) describes all development as proceeding "from a state of
relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing
differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration." (Werner, 1957,
p. 126) He lists five aspects of the developmental process. They are:
differentiated versus undifferentiated, diffuse versus articulated, rigid
versus flexible, labile versus stable, and syncretic versus discrete.
Werner's general view of mental functions involves the following assumptions,
(l) Mental functioning may be analyzed into a number of differentiated func-
tions. (2) Some of these functions are lower, developmentally, than others,
and the lower ones are subordinated to the higher. (3) The same objective
achievement may be brought about by different functions. (U) Functioning at
any level tends to stabilize and rigidify in such a way as to be adaptive to
the environment.
A study by Werner and Kaplan (1952) on the acquistion of word meaning
illustrates these principles of mental functioning. The task presented to
Ss in this experiment was to discover the meaning of a nonsense word from its
usage in a series of 12 sentences. The groups of children ranged in age from
8 years to 13 years. Before the child can perform satisfactorily in this test
situation, there are several different levels of concepts and modes of func-
tioning he must have acquired. These concepts and levels of functioning are
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indicated by such measures as rigidity of response, use of concrete realism,
word sentence fusion, integration of meanings of a word, and the lability of
usage of words. In his analysis of these data, Werner combined all the pro-
cesses representing the more primitive types of thinking and called them
A-processes. He next combined the more advanced processes and called them
B-processes. By showing how often these were used for the different age
groups he was able to illustrate his hypothesis that development is not a
single-line process but rather a gradual replacement of primitive processes
by more advanced ones.
Werner postulated a sensoritonic theory of perception which has as its
basic postulate, "a perceptual property is an experience which corresponds to
a particular relation between organismic state and stimuli from an object."
(Werner and Wapner, 1956, p. 316) We have here an independent restatement of
the notion presented earlier that representations resulting from perception
are a function of both the stimuli and the organism.
In brief, Werner's contributions suggest that for any given mental pro-
cess in a child of a given age, we can assume that this process will be super-
seded by one which is more discrete, articulated, and organizational. The
developmental process may thus be divided meaningfully into stages when it is
qualitatively analyzed in terms of how the child functions as judged by objec-
tive criteria.
Of decided importance to the research in this thesis is Piaget's theory
of cognitive growth. Piaget (1950 ) believes that while physical development
seems to be continuous, intellectual development progresses in discrete
stages. The order of succession of stages is constant, although the ages at
which different stages are attained may vary somewhat, depending on the
child's unique experience and cultural milieu. As the child moves from one
12
stage to the next, early structures become Integra Loci wi th later onea. In
particular the transition from "concrete operations" to "formal operations"
is of interest to us in this thesis. When Piaget describes this transition
he refers to certain events which are characteristic of the two levels. At
the level of concrete operations, the child's concepts and his understanding
of situations are likely to be determined by what he happens to perceive,
which is often a single salient aspect of a particular object or event.
Ordinarily he will not relate different aspects or dimensions of a situation
to one another. The ability to deal with verbal expressions of logical rela-
tions requires the use of formal operations as distinct from concrete opera-
tions and the child ordinarily does not use these until the age of 11 or 12.
The adolescent can reason deductively, making hypotheses about problem solu-
tions, and keeping in mind many variables simultaneously.
This is very similar to Bruner's discussion of the transition between the
iconic mode of representation and the symbolic. Both of these theorists' con-
siderations of the cognitive abilities of the younger versus the older child
would cause us to predict that relative to person perception, the younger
children will attend to perceptual cues and the older children will be able to
infer intentions implied by the changes in cues.
Developmental Approaches To Social Perception .
To a certain degree, Piaget's conceptions have been applied to changes
that occur in children's moral judgments and this can be considered to be a
special case of social perception. Piaget's (191*8) work regarding the moral
judgments and understanding of children shows a developmental progression.
The younger child, from four years to eight years, is characterized by what
Piaget called heteronomous morality which means "subject to another's law."
The young child conceives of "wrong doing in highly literal, objective terms
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without regard to intentions..." (Brown, 196;?, p. I1O3) The second morality,
which develops after eight years and is complete shortly thereafter, was
called autonomous by Piaget and means "subject to one's own law." The older
children, when asked to judge who was the naughtier of two children in two
different situations, would base their judgments on the intentions of the
child rather than on the magnitude of the damage done. Kohlberg (1963)
increased the difficulty of the dilemmas he presented to children and found
stages of moral development beyond those of Piaget. Thus, moral judgment
studies provide us with a very specific case of social perception in that
judgments of transgressions and attributions of guilt do rely on an observer's
perception of the intentions of another.
Some developmental studies of general social perception have already been
carried out. For example, Gollin (1958) showed 11, lh, and 17 year olds
silent films and obtained written descriptions about the "star" in each film.
He found an increasing use of both inference and concept with age. He also
found that use of local inference, based on a single aspect of behavior,
occurs earlier than does general inference, which is based upon several
aspects of behavior. However, there are certain difficulties with Gollin'
s
research. First, Gollin used diverse themes to see how Ss could integrate
these into a unitary impression. But in judgments of actual people the
observer need not necessarily perceive diverse characteristics. For example,
if a person is perceived as being kind, then it is possible that an act of
promiscuous solicitation will be construed as another act of kindness, espe-
cially by a young child. A child could interpret the actions of a woman who
walks up to a man, talks to him, and then they walk away together, as that of
a kind woman who shows a stranger his way. Second, 1|0$ of 26 children aged
8 to 10 in Gollin 's pilot study confused the star with some other character.
3il
Third, only $0% of these children recognized both themes. This is consistent
with the finding of Heider and Simmel (19UU) that when their task consisted of
an understanding of the social implications of the simultaneous movement of
two objects, the results were ambiguous. Finally, the necessity of having his
subjects give written impressions precludes the possibility of using children
in the younger age groups which would allow us to consider the relevance of
Bruner's and Piaget's findings to person perception.
More recently, Signell (1966) studied cognitive complexity in person per-
ception and nation perception. Her results offer substantial support for
developmental movement toward increasingly complex single concepts, cognitive
structure, and content.
Zigler, Levine, and Gould (1966) showed cartoons which required no read-
ing skill to children and related the underlying cognitive processes to humor
appreciation. Their overall findings indicate a positive correlation between
expressions of humor for a particular level of cartoon and grade level of the
children. As it became more difficult to see the humor in the cartoons, only
the older children, grade 5, expressed any humor when shown it. They found no
difference in the responses given by the different sexes.
Yarrow and Campbell (1963) studied person perception in children aged 8
through 13. From the examination of children's perceptions of others as
reflected by interviews, they concluded that their descriptions of others were
dominated by social relevance. Evidence of social relevance was provided by
the emphasis of the child on interaction and the common use of evaluative
1
appraisals. Yarrow and Campbell also contended that "When perceptual complex-
ity is considered there were no consistent sex differences, but age trends
appear. Older children tended to give more complex perceptual reports."
(Yarrow and Campbell, 1963, p. 6U)
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Whiteman (1967) studied children's conceptions of psychological causality
in 5, 6, 8, and 9 year olds. They interviewed these children with respect to
their understanding of the motivations of a child in seven different story
situations. They found that significant age differences appeared with respect
to individual stories and to a composite Motivation Index that they devised.
Whiteman concluded with two remarks that are particularly relevant to the pre-
sent study. "The relative difficulty of the younger child in. . .decentering
from a focus on overt behavior to a more covert intent would not be inconsis-
tent with Piaget's distinction between the 'intuitive' child (ages U— 7 ) and
the 'concrete operational' child (ages 7-11 )." In addition, he felt that "One
would expect the growth of understanding of psychological causality to paral-
lel the growth of moral judgments based on the other's underlying intentions ,
rather than on his overt behaviors." (Whiteman, 1967, p. 155)
Dubin and Dubin (1965), in a review of research on children's social per-
ceptions, concluded that some important generalizations could be made which
could prove to be very useful, especially in the clinical area. They divided
the research into the global areas of self-perception, perception of parents,
and perception of other authority figures. In general, it was demonstrated in
the various studies reviewed that there were changes in the nature of the
child's phenomenal world which corresponded to changes in age. However, it
would be difficult to say specifically how this came about. They say "The
most parsimonious conclusion that can be reached about these age related per-
ceptions is that, with increasing age, children's perceptions of adults become
more realistic, that is, corresponds more accurately with objective character-
istics of persons. At the same time distinctions among adults become grounded
in more subtle perceptual characteristics." (Dubin and Dubin, 1965, p. 831)
Relative to methodological criticisms of the research they reviewed, they make
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two main points. One of the major problems in research concerned with child-
ren's perceptions is the use of research designs that hold age constant. They
feel that holding age constant interferes with the development of the kind of
process-models that are needed. In addition, they contended that new tech-
niques are needed for measuring social perception in young children "where
socialization is incomplete and language facility limited." (Dubin and Dubin,
1965, P. 835)
While the direct purpose of this research is to investigate the hypothe-
sis that as children grow older, they depend less on the perceptual qualities
of artificial social stimuli, and more on their structured relationships which
convey intentional meanings; our specific aims include varying age and testing
a new technique for the investigation of social perception in children that
does not depend on facility with written language.
Chapter 3
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The general research plan involves testing different aged children on a
standard social judgment task. In order to carry out the aim of the study,
the task was arranged so that children could respond either in terms of the
perceptual qualities or in terms of the intentions conveyed by changes in
these perceptual qualities.
The Social Judgment Task.
Our stimulus material consists of cartoon sequences which portray arti-
ficial social objects in socially meaningful interactions. Following ideas
suggested by Heider and Simmel (19HU), we have found that adult Ss will
readily accept geometric figures as representative of people. Also, they
will accept as socially meaningful, multibox cartoon sequences showing these
artificial social objects in varying interaction patterns. (See Heider, 1967)
Intentional meanings are conveyed here by physical and behavioral changes in
the objects. For example, see cartoons 1 & 2 in Figure 1. Rappoport (1967)
has obtained data which indicate that in such cartoons the figure reduced in
size is judged as more friendly and generous.
The four cartoons used in this study are shown in Figure 1. Quantity
Change is the perceptual quality manipulated in these cartoons. In cartoon
one, the large circle on the left approaches the small circle on the right,
they touch, and in the last slide they are back in their original position
with the circle on the left even larger than it was before and the small
circle on the right even smaller. (It might be noted here that in all four
cartoons, the movements of geometric figures are held constant. ) In cartoon
•18
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Cartoon #1: Change in size; increase in the larger object.
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Cartoon #2: Change in size; reduction in the larger object.
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Cartoon #3:
«
Change in number; inequality increases.
1
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Cartoon #lj:
Figure 1:
Change in number; inequality is eliminated.
Cartoon Sequences
-
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two, the largo circle on the left ends up smaller than before and the small
circle becomes larger with the result that in the last slide they are the
same size. In cartoon three, the inequality, in terms of the number of
objects contained by the circle and triangle, is increased with the result
that in the last slide the circle has all the objects and the triangle has
none. In cartoon four, the inequality is eliminated with the end result of
equality being obtained.
Each cartoon was presented as a sequence of four slides with a five
second exposure time for each slide. Cartoons 1 & 2 show changes in the rela -
tive size of two social objects. Cartoons 3 & h show changes in the numerical
quantities associated with two social objects. The size and quantity changes
are parallel. That is, cartoon 1 shows an initially larger figure approach a
smaller one and grow still larger. Cartoon 3 shows a figure with two objects
approach a figure with one object and end with three objects. The changes
shown in these cartoons are parallel in that an initial inequality is shown to
increase. In cartoons 2 & k, an initial inequality is shown to be eliminated.
The changes in quantity described above are designed to convey the inten-
tions of give and take. When a quantitatively larger social object (either in
size or number) is shown to approach another social object and the result is
that its size is decreased, the action can only be meaningfully construed as
giving. Unpublished results obtained by Rappoport (1967) show that college
Ss, when forced to categorize such a situation, almost unanimously see it as
giving. In the reverse situation, that of a larger social object approaching
another social object and the result being an increase in size, the impression
is of taking. Pilot testing, carried out in connection with preparation of
this thesis, showed that older children also indicated that give-take inten-
tions were apparent to them. One of the hypotheses to be tested in this
20
thesis follows from the above discussion of intentions, viz., if children can
perceive the intentions, they should select the object seen as giving.
These cartoons were designed so that if the cartoon was construed in
socially meaningful terms, the result would be that the object reduced in
quantity would be considered as being nicer or better liked than the object
which had an increase. For example, in cartoon 1, if the large circle is
seen as taking something from the small circle, the small circle will be liked
better or, if the small circle is seen as sharing or giving something to the
large circle it still will be the better liked of the two. This observation
holds for cartoons 2, 3, and.U as well. In effect, the quantity changes that
take place in the cartoons were designed so that they would convey intentions
of give or take.
It is important to note that the four cartoons are designed to show two
types of quantity change in two different ways. Cartoons 1 & 2, showing size
changes, are considered to be relatively abstract because a change in relative
size is open to more interpretation regarding interpersonal relations than is
a discrete change in number. Everyday experience provides many examples
involving transfer of objects between persons, but few changes in size. More-
over, to enhance the abstract and concrete character of the material, cartoons
1 & 2 were presented to Ss with an abstract introductory statement which
states "I am going to show you a cartoon about two people." Cartoons 3 & h
were presented to Ss with a more concrete introductory statement which said
"I am going to show you a cartoon about two children who have some toys." In
brief, both the cartoon material and the mode of presentation were arranged
so that cartoons 1 & 2 were relatively more abstract than cartoons 3 & h. It
was therefore hypothesized that children would be better able to infer inten-
tions conveyed in cartoons 3 & h than in cartoons 1 & 2.
21
Procedure.
The subjects tested were 6U male and female grade school children. Of
these, 21 were in the first grade, 22 were in the fourth grade, and 21 were
in the sixth grade. These particular grades were selected because they con-
tain children whose ages are comparable to different levels of cognitive
development as described by Piaget and Bruner. Mean age of Ss in grade 1 was
*
6:7, grade h was 9:7, and grade 6 was 12:0. All Ss were tested individually
in a small room which contained a table with a projector on it and a projec-
tion screen on the wall. Seated at the table beside E, S was instructed as
to how he was to proceed. Briefly, he was told that he would be shown a car-
toon on the screen in front of him. He was to watch it and tell E a story
about what was happening in the cartoon. Before testing any of the children,
the whole class was told by E that they would be shown cartoons using circles
and triangles. After receiving instructions in the experimental room, E then
started the projector and showed S a cartoon which consisted of the sequence
of four slides with a five second exposure for each slide and with the last
slide remaining on the screen. The S was then asked to proceed with his
story. While S told the story, E recorded it. After S indicated he was
finished with the story, he was then asked to either tell E which object he
liked best, or go up to the screen and point to the object that he liked best.
After making his preference he was then asked why he liked that one best.
The S was then given the appropriate instructions for the next cartoon and
the same procedure was followed. In brief, the procedure involved;
(A) Instructions; (B) Cartoon was shown; (C) Story was told by S; (D) S indi-
cated object preference; (E) Reason given for object choice. Then the follow-
ing cartoons were shown using the same procedure.
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Order Effects.
Since each S saw the four cartoons there could be uncontrolled order
effects. To control for this, which of the cartoons he saw first was deter-
mined in advance in order that each of the four cartoons would be first an
approximately equal number of times for any one class. Since the cartoons
can be classed according to whether they were abstract (A) or concrete (C)
and also as to whether an inequality was increased (I) or eliminated (E),
it was decided to follow a cartoon of a particular type, e.g., AI, with one
that differed on both dimensions. Since it was not possible to have both
dimensions different for the third cartoon shown any particular S, the dimen-
sion which was changed was that of abstract-concrete since this dimension was
more relevant for the purposes of this research. This resulted in the follow-
ing four orders: (l) AI, CE, AE, CI; (2) AE, CI, AI, CE; (3) CI, AE, CE, AIj
(U) CE, AI, CI, AE. These four orders resulted in an arrangement in which
each of the cartoons is shown in each position an equal number of times.
Content Analysis of Responses.
As originally planned, S's performance on the task was to be analyzed
according to two criteria: object preference and the reason given to justify
his choice. Subsequent to testing all the subjects, it was decided to analyze
the stories by devising categories which would exhaust the content of the
statements made in telling the stories. This decision was made in order to
provide a further test of the hypothesis that social object preferences are
mediated by intentional meanings. It was assumed here that children who pre-
ferred the objects reduced in size would provide stories that contained
references to intention more frequently than children who do not prefer the
reduced objects.
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The stories told by Ss were typed and submitted to judges for scoring in
four categories. The categories were: (A) Statements of affect concerning
the social objects; (B) Statements of physical changes, i.e., a gain or loss
relating to the objects; (C) Statements made of movement, and (D) Statements
of intention, i.e., giving, taking, or sharing. The average agreement among
three judges across the categories was 93#- The following criteria were used
to determine if any of the statements in a given story were to be scored in a
particular category.
(A) Affect. If S considers the objects as liking each other; If S refers
to the objects as friends; If S sees people as fighting; If one person is bad
or good. An example would be: "The circle boy goes over to the triangle boy,
fights with him and takes his toy."
(B) Quantity Change. If S comments specifically that there has been
effected a gain or loss in either size or number. An example would be:
"John went over to Joe and took his toy and now John has them all and Joe
doesn't have any."
(c) Movement. If S refers to one person going to another place or going
for a walk or running. Example: "The boy went over to the girl's house to
play."
(D) Intention. If reference was made in the story to one person giving,
taking, sharing, or grabbing something from another. For example: "The boy
went over to the girl and shared one of his candy bars with her because she
hadn't any."
The criteria used to analyze the reasons given by S to justify his choice
for one or another of the various social objects was simply whether or not the
statements involved a specific or implied value judgment concerning the act of
giving, taking, or sharing. A statement made as a justification met the
2U
criteria if it reflected the idea that one person was better or worse than
another: any statement about the individual being a bully, one who shares,
is selfish, generous, or kind; or if he has taken or given something to
another. For example: "I don't like John because he is a bully." The aver-
age agreement among three judges here was 9h%.
The third response measure, social object preference, required no con-
tent analysis since Ss had to select one of two objects.
Design Summary.
To recapitulate, the study was designed so that different aged children
were required to respond to a set of four standard cartoons showing quantity
changes in artificial social objects. The changes shown involved an increase
or decrease in number and size. In general it was hypothesized that older
children would respond to the cartoons in terms of social meanings conveyed
by these changes. They were expected to prefer the objects reduced in
quantity, and they were expected to justify their preference by referring to
the positive intentions of the preferred object. By contrast, younger child-
ren were expected to assign relatively arbitrary meanings to the cartoon
sequences. And the reasons given to justify their preference for an object
were expected to relate to that which is perceptually given rather than to
intentions which can be inferred from the actions of objects.
Chapter k
RESULTS
The data in this research results from response measures which fall into
three groupings: Object choices, stories, and justifications. Since all of
these data consist of nominal frequencies, the chi square technique is used
throughout for significance testing.
Social Object Preferences.
After Ss had seen the cartoon and told a story about it, they were then
asked "Which of these children (people) do you like better?" They could
either respond verbally or they were allowed to point to the object. The
object preferences are shown in Table 1. Chi square analysis of these data
shows that grade level is significantly related to object preference only on
the more concrete cartoons (3 & h)-
The general relationship among object preference and cartoon type,
abstract (1 & 2) and concrete (3 & k) was further examined by analyzing
object preference by cartoon type within each grade. No significant rela-
tions were found in grades one (X2 = .31^) or four (X2 = 1.886). But for
grade six, the relationship was significant (X2 = U.20, d.f. = 1, p .00).
Inspection of Table 2 shows that sixth grade children choose the smaller
object more often in the concrete cartoons.
Thus, it is clear that older children choose the object that is reduced
in quantity in the concrete cartoons but no significant trend appears for
the abstract cartoons across the grades.
TABLE 1
Chi square analysis of social object preferences
stated in answer to the question, "Which of these
persons do you like better?"
Larger/Smaller and More/Less refers to the status
of the two figures shown in the last box of each
cartoon.
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Cartoons # :
Grade 1 2 3
I
1
(N-21)
Larger Smaller Larger Smaller More Less More Less
12 9 8 11 11 9 12 9
it
(N-22) 9 13 8 11* 7 15 k 18
6
(N-21) 7 Hi 7 Hi 3 18 3 18
x
2 2.h3
(N.S.)
.36
(N.S.)
7.60
(.05)
ii. Uo
(.01)
TABLE 2
Chi square analysis of relation between social
object preferences and cartoon type in grade 6.
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S
C
o
o
-p
u
IDO
Social Object Preferences
Larger Smaller
Abstract
1 & 2
m 28
Concrete
3 & h
6 36
20
Content Analyses of Stories.
After S had seen a cartoon, and with the last slide remaining on the
screen, he was asked to tell a story about what had taken place in the car-
toon. The E made notes of S's stories, trying to capture the essential
points of the stories although it was not possible to record it verbatim.
For example, a story recorded from an S in grade 6 to cartoon 3* "The
circle boy came over to the triangle boy. Circle boy had more toys than
the triangle boy but he wanted more so he took the toy from the triangle
boy." The stories were coded into categories designed to exhaust the person-
relevant content. These categories were: (A) Affect, (B) Quantity Change,
(C) Movement, (D) Intention. Two independent judges and the author then
scored the stories according to these content criteria. The above example
would be scored for movement, quantity change, and intention, but not affect.
Table 3 shows category frequencies arranged by grade and cartoons. Table h
presents the chi square analysis used to test the relationship between story
content and cartoon type across all three grade levels. The result (X =
59.567, d.f. = 3j p<^.001) shows a highly significant relation between car-
toon type and story content categories.
In order to further analyze this effect, analyses were made for each
category by arranging 3X2 contingency tables for separate tests of the
relation between grade level and cartoon type. None of these results reach
the standard (.05) level of significance.
Inspection of Table h shows a general relationship between cartoon type
and scores received in a particular category but the chi square analysis of
the difference between the cartoon types was not significant.
Chi square analyses were then made of the effect of cartoon type on each
individual category. Table 5 presents these analyses. Movement is the only
TABLE 3
Content analysis of childrens' stories.
Frequencies for the content categories
are arranged by grade level and cartoon
type.
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Cartoons #:
Abstract
1 &.2
Concrete
3 & It
Grade 1 2 Total 3 It Total
1
Affect It h 8 2 2 it
Quantity
Change 1 3
•
It 2 1 3
Movement 15 13 28 12 16 28
Intention 1 1 2 1 1
It
Affect 6 6 12 h It
Quantity
Change 8 10 18 3 It 7
Movement 16 20 36 12 9 21
Intention 5 3 8 17 19 36
6
Affect It 2 6 It 1 5
Quantity
Change 10 13 23 1 1 2
Movement 15 17 32 13 9 22
Intention 7 It 11 20 21 Itl
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TABLE b
Chi square analysis of relation between Story-
Content Categories and Type of Cartoon for all
grade levels.
CO
CD
•H
U
O
W)
CD
-p
o
-p
c
<d
-p
c
o
o
t?
o
-p
CO
Cartoon Type
Abstract
1 & 2
Concrete
3 & U
Affect 26 13
Quantity Change U5 12
Movement 96 71
Intention 21 78
TAB IE $
X analysis of the relation between cartoon
types and story content categories across
grade levels.
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Categories X2
Affect x2 = U.3U p/.0$
Quantity Change X2 = 9.$$ pZ.Ol
Movement X2 - 3.7U N.S.
Intention X2 = 32.82 pZ.001
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category for which cartoon type has no effect. This demonstrates that car-
toon type does have a significant effect on the number of times stories will
be scored in a particular category
.
Several statements about the data seem justified here.
(1) Analyses of the interaction chi square of Table h is highly
significant.
(2) When chi squares are used on individual comparisons to see if
there is a significant difference between the scores in a particular category
by cartoon type, we find, with the exception of Movement, that there is,
especially for Quantity Change and Intention.
Since Quantity Change and Intention seem to be contributing a large
o
part of the significant interaction X for Table h, it was decided to analyze
the relation between these two categories and type of cartoon. Table 6
results in a chi square of CU9.377, d.f. = 1, p<.001.) Table 7, which is
only for grades k and 6, results in an even larger chi square; (52.55, d.f.
1, p <.001.)
Tables 6 & 7 and accompanying X2, s show that there is a highly signifi-
cant interaction between the Quantity Change and Intention categories and the
two types of cartoons. Inspection of the tables shows that the type of car-
toon affects the content of stories in such a manner that as scorings in
Quantity Change increase, Intention decreases (in abstract cartoons) and if
a preponderance of the stories are scored in the Intention category there is
a concommitant drop in the content of the stories which meets the criteria of
the category Quantity Change.
Justifications For Object Preferences.
After S had seen the cartoon, told a story about it, and given an object
preference, he was then asked why he liked that particular one the best.
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TABLE 6
Chi square analysis of the relation between
cartoon type and the Quantity Change and
Intention categories across grade levels.
Cartoon Type
Abstract
1 & 2
Concrete
3 & h
Quantity Change U5 12
Intention 21 78
TABIE 7
Chi square analysis of the relation between
cartoon type and the Quantity Change and
Intention categories for grades k and 6.
3U
Categories Cartoon Type
Abstract
1 & 2
Concrete
3 & h
Quantity Change Ul 9
Intention 19 77
After all Ss had been tested, the justifications were typed on separate cards
and then judged to determine if they met the criteria outlined in Chapter 3.
Table 8 presents the number of acceptable justifications by cartoon type for
each of the three grades. A chi square analysis of the overall interaction
between cartoon type and grade level was not significant, (X 3- 89, d.f.
2).
It was possible to separately test the significance of the difference
between grade levels across cartoons and the difference between cartoon types
across grade levels. The chi square for the first analysis, difference
between grade levels, was obtained by finding the difference of each grade
level from a mean of the three, (X2 = 1*8. 61*7, d.f. = 2, p<f.001). Using the
same method, the chi square for cartoon type was: (X - 21.31U, d.f. = 1,
p<.001). These analyses only confirm what is apparent from an inspection of
Table 8; viz.: that there are an increasing number of acceptable justifica-
tions as children increase in age and that almost all (38 of U2) of the 6th
graders give acceptable justifications for the concrete cartoons and about
half (19 of U2) do so for the abstract' cartoons.
In sum, then, analyses of the three measures obtained in this research
yeild the following results.
When we compare the effect of grade level on social object preference,
we find that this effect occurs only for the concrete cartoons. In other
words, whether or not they choose the object reduced in quantity does not
allow us to differentiate among the grades for the abstract cartoons. When
we compare the effect of type of cartoon on social object preference for each
individual grade, we find this only has a significant effect for grade six.
By separating the content of the stories into four categories, some
interesting relations become apparent. The number of times a category is
TABIE 8
Chi square analysis of the effects of cartoon
type and grade level on the number of acceptable
social object justification statements given by
children.
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Grade
Cartoons:
Abstract
1 & 2
Concrete
3 & h
1
(N-8U) 2
k
(N-88) 6 30
6
(N-8U) 19 38
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scored depends on the type of cartoon and the categories Quantity Chango and
Intention tend to vary inversly given a particular type of cartoon.
The reasons given to justify S's object preference are increasingly
acceptable as Ss increase in age. Three times as many sixth graders give
acceptable justifications for the abstract cartoons as do the fourth graders.
A striking progression is noted if we compare the percentage of Ss who give
acceptable justifications relative to the number possible, for the three
grades.
Grade 1 — 2%
Grade U ~ hX%
Grade 6 — 68#
Thus we see that all three response measures give support in varying
degrees for the hypothesis that as children increase in age there is an
increasing sophistication in their use of perceptual cues relative to a
social perception situation.
Chapter 5
Discussion and Summary
»
Findings.
In general, the results support the hypothesis that as children grow
older, they depend less on the perceptual qualities of artificial social
stimuli, and more on their structured relationships which convey intentional
meanings. Specifically, it was found that older children prefer social
objects reduced in quantity and justify their preference by referring to
the positive intentions of the preferred object. This was substantiated
for the fourth and sixth graders in the concrete cartoons but only partially
so for the abstract cartoons. The social object choice data show that for
the concrete cartoons there is a dramatic change between the younger and
older children, i.e., the younger children tend to prefer the larger object
and the older children (grades U & 6) prefer the smaller. This finding
coincides with that of the developmental cognitive theorists in which they
find a major shift in cognitive processes in the age groups U-7 and 7-11.
The content of the stories provided by children to fit the cartoons
appears to depend on the child's ability to attend to more than one cue at
a time and his ability to understand the underlying meaning these cues pro-
vide. First graders pay attention mainly to the movement of the social
objects regardless of the type of cartoon. However, the comparison of fourth
and sixth grader's responses to the abstract and concrete cartoons is parti-
cularly revealing. When these children can handle the information provided
by the perceptual cues, as in the concrete cartoons, their stories emphasize
the underlying intentions of the social objects. But when the cartoon is
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more difficult, as in the abstract cartoons, they apparently are les3 able to
see the underlying intentional structure and comment on two perceptually
obvious cues, viz., quantity changes and movement. This result is also in
line with cognitive development findings. Here we see evidence that even
though a child can attend to more than one cue, this in itself is not suffic-
ient for higher level cognition. In reference to the number of perceptual
attributes being attended to, Bruner remarks "The younger child is attending
to one... The older child can attend to two features, but he does not yet
have the means for relating them..." (Bruner, 196U, p. 8)
Finally, the reasons given by the children to justify their choice of a
social object are highly indicative of an awareness of the social meaning of
the intentions conveyed in the cartoons. The older children, who can under-
stand the underlying intentions in the cartoons, seem to be aware of the
implications of these intentions for personality. Their justificatory state-
ments make their understanding of these implications quite clear. For
example, some of the reasons which met the criteria of acceptable justifica-
tions were: "Because he was nice and let the circle boy borrow the toy."
"Because he wasn't selfish and he shared with others." "Because he was nice
to the girl." Some which did not meet the criteria were: "Because he knows
how to ride a horse." "Because he is the littlest." "Because he looks like
a boy." "Because he is a man." Virtually all of the justifications were as
clear as the above examples therefore the three judges who scored the justi-
fications had no difficulty determining whether or not the children were
responding to the intentions conveyed by the cartoons.
While effectively all the sixth graders give acceptable justifications
for the concrete cartoons, only about half of them do so for the abstract car-
toons. We would have expected that nearly all the sixth graders would have
Uo
given acceptable justifications for all the cartoons since at age 12 their
cognitive processes should be characteristic of the level described by Bruner
(196U) as "symbolic" and by Piaget (1950) as "formal operations." The fact
that they do not, indicates that developmental levels in social judgment are
not yet clearly delineated and probably more precision will be required to
show subtle differences. Relatively small changes in the figures and
instructions used in this research have significant effects on children's
ability to perceive intentionality. While we are not able to specify exactly
which of these changes is causing the effect, or if it is an interaction of
the two, these 'findings do suggest some interesting possibilities for future
research. The variables which define our concrete and abstract cartoons are
instructions and type of quantity change. These could be manipulated in
future research to determine which has the stronger effect. A preliminary
check made in connection with this study, was in fact designed to examine
relations between instructions and quantity change. Several subjects in
grade 5 were shown concrete cartoons with abstract instructions and abstract
cartoons with concrete instructions. This check was inadequate to answer the
substantial question raised for two reasons. (1) Proper investigation of this
question requires a full scale study. That is, one should really show child-
ren of different ages all the different combinations of the two variables.
(2) The check was inadequate because it turned out that this particular group
of ]?th graders were a conspicuously slow class; i.e., they were not
representative.
Methodology.
Object choices. The methodology employed here of having children res-
pond by pointing at the object liked best requires some further discussion.
It was pointed out previously that some investigators have not worked with
la
younger children in the area of social perception because of their inability
to perform effectively with trait scales or sociometric devices. It was also
noted that the manner in which an adult observer construes a child's inter-
actions and the way the child sees them constitute two different "realities."
(See Dubin and Dubin, 1965, and Yarrow and Campbell, 1963). The method used
here of having the child point at the object worked very well, especially
with the younger children (grade 1). For example, after watching cartoon
three and telling a story about it, a boy in the first grade was then asked
which of these children he liked better. He pointed to the circle with the
three objects and said "That one." If E had any doubts about the exact
direction the child was pointing, or even if he didn't, the child was gener-
ally asked to go up to the screen and point directly at the object he pre-
ferred. This served two purposes, viz., for the younger children, who are
apt to be fidgety, this provided four breaks in the experimental routine and
in addition it also served as an effective device to make sure that E was
recording the actual object the child preferred. Verbal checks are difficult
to employ here since younger children aren't as yet facile with concepts of
left and right.
A note might be appropriate here regarding E's interpretation of how
Ss construed the experimental situation. Typically, they seemed to enjoy it
and were enthusiastic in telling their stories. To account for this attitude
and their lack of reticence, it must be remembered that their participation
in the research was in the nature of a special treat. They were allowed to
leave their normal class routine in order to view cartoons that might be used
on T.V. Hence, E was able to establish rapport quickly.
Stories. After watching the cartoon, and with the last slide on the
screen, the child then proceeded to tell his story about what he considered
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to be happening in the cartoon sequence. In giving their story S would some-
times look at E, who would appear attentive to what S was saying while at the
same time writing it down, but S would most often look at the screen. The
stories generally were cohesive units about boys and girls, mothers and
fathers, or brothers and sisters engaging in some interaction. For example,
consider a typical story given by a first grader after seeing cartoon 1.
"There are two people. They didn't like each other, (pause) They didn't
like each other so they turned and walked off. They weren't friends. They
tossed their heads and walked off. When asked which of these people he liked
better, S said "The little girl, because the other one is a big fat women."
When asked why he liked the little girl, S said "Because I like skinny people."
Or, in effect, he likes the girl because he doesn't like the big fat woman.
This story is typical of the first graders in several ways. It takes note of
the fact that there is movement of the objects but no reference is made to
anything that would account for the change in size of the objects. Also, the
story was typical in length. The E was generally able to record almost
verbatim what was being said. In the few instances where this was not poss-
ible, shorter notes preserved the essential points in the child's story.
A tape recorder was not used for two reasons. In some pilot work a
tape recorder was used several times and children generally responded to its
presence in one of two ways. Either they were awed by it and would continu-
ally glance at it, so much so that it made them lose the thread of their
story, or they seemed concerned with saying something unrelated to the car-
toon in the hope of hearing it replayed. In addition, when the recordings
that were made were subsequently played back after the experimental session,
the background noise of the projector, etc., rendered the recording almost
unintelligible. Consequently, if S does not speak directly into a microphone
I»3
the recordings are useless because of background noise. If he does speak
directly into the microphone he may become preoccupied with the recording
apparatus. Suitable conditions could be devised to obtain a recording of
the experimental session without S being aware of it and this would be pre-
ferred, but such facilities were not available for this research.
Another point relative to how the stories were recorded is that when the
older children construed the cartoon in socially meaningful terms, as was the
case for most Ss for cartoons 3 & h, the stories they told were brief and E
could in fact record them verbatim. For example, a story given by a sixth
grader to cartoon 3* "The circle boy is older and he sees a younger child
with a toy that he likes so he takes it away from him." This observation is
especially interesting since it fits the idea of higher levels of cognitive
processes being more efficient. In fact, Bruner stated that "...in one
respect cognitive growth might be conceived as achieving a capacity for
simplicity in dealing with information." (Bruner, et al, 1966, p. xi)
The pattern of frequencies shown in Table 3 suggests some important con-
clusions. The category of Affect shows a trend to being scored more often in
the younger children's stories and more often in the abstract cartoons but as
the frequencies are small no conclusions would seem warranted. Movement is
scored relatively consistently across grades and there seems to be a trend
for the older children to comment on the movement less in the concrete car-
toons. The two remaining categories, Quantity Change and Intention
,
do show
some consistent changes relative to both grade level and cartoon type. The
important conclusions that seem justified on the basis of analyses made are
as follows. In all their stories the young children emphasize Movement but
not Quantity Change or Intention. This shows that they are attending to only
one perceptual cue. In addition, all three response measures indicate that
III.
the younger children are unable to understand intentions conveyed in the
cartoons. The older children also mention movement; however, when they
understand the material their stories emphasize intentions. When they do
not understand the material they emphasize quantity changes. It is felt
that when the intentions are understood, quantity changes are not mentioned
specifically because they are incorporated into the statements of intention.
For future research, this implies that specific hypotheses could be tested
about the content of children's stories when they understand and when they
do not understand the intentions conveyed by the stimulus material.
Conclusions.
1. The use of cartoon sequences using geometric figures as artifical
social objects is an effective device for the study of person perception in
children.
2. The three response measures all provide support for the existence
of developmental levels in person perception.
3. Statements made by developmental cognitive theorists relating to
the use of perceptual cues and their integration are applicable to psycho-
logical causality in a social situation as well as to physical causality.
k. Implications for future research lay in the fact that more sophis-
ticated designs could be employed to test specific hypotheses concerning
the development of social judgment processes.
\6
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As part of a larger project concerning the use of cartoon sequences for
studies of social perception, this study investigates children's ability to
infer socially meaningful intentions from changes in physical quantities
associated with artificial persons. Following Piaget, it is hypothesized that
younger children will respond in terms of the apparent intentions underlying
these differences. Moreover, changes in relative number should be seen as
socially meaningful at an earlier age than changes in relative size.
Sixty-four first, fourth and sixth grade children were tested individu-
ally on four cartoons showing changes in either size or number. Each cartoon
was presented as a sequence of four slides shown in rapid succession. After
viewing each cartoon, the subject was asked (1) to explain its story, (2) to
point out which "person" he liked better, and (3) to justify his choice.
Three response measures were used; object choices, stories, and justifi-
cations. The object choices significantly differentiated between the three
grades for concrete but not abstract cartoons. The stories were analyzed in
terms of categories and two of them, Quantity Change and Intention, varied
inversly relative to grade level and cartoon type. Justifications given for
selection of a particular object was the most sensitive of the three measures
in showing developmental levels and differences in the two types of cartoons.
The use of cartoon sequences using geometric figures as artificial social
objects is an effective device for the study of person perception in children.
The three response measures all provide support for the existence of develop-
mental levels in person perception. Statements made by developmental cogni-
tive theorists relating to the use of perceptual cues and their integration
are applicable to psychological causality in a social situation as well as to
physical causality. Implications for future research lies in the fact that
this method could be used in a more sophisticated fashion
by increasing the
variety of cues and the various interactions of the stimuli.
